New
zero-day attack vector has significant amplification factor and could be used
to enhance effectiveness of botnet tools used to launch recent attacks on Dyn,
Krebs on Security and OVH
Marlborough, MA and London, UK – October 25, 2016
– Corero
Network Security today disclosed a significant new
zero-day DDoS attack vector observed for the first time against its customers
last week. The new technique is an amplification attack, which utilizes
the Lightweight Directory Access Protocol (LDAP). LDAP is one of the most widely used
protocols for accessing username and password information in databases like
Active Directory, which is integrated in most online servers.
While Corero’s team of DDoS mitigation experts has so far
only observed a handful of short but extremely powerful attacks against their
protected customers originating from this vector; the technique has potential
to inflict significant damage by leveraging an amplification factor seen at a
peak of as much as 55x. Therefore, in terms of its potential scale, if combined
with the Internet of Things botnet that was utilized in the recent 655 Gigabyte
attack against Brian Krebs’s website, we could soon see new records broken in
the DDoS attack landscape, with potential to reach tens of Terabits per second
in size in the not too distant future. The DDoS landscape has been
extremely volatile in recent weeks, particularly with the release of the Mirai
code and subsequent Mirai infected Internet of Things (IoT) devices, and we
expect this trend to continue for the foreseeable future.
Dave Larson, CTO/COO at Corero Network Security, explains: “This
new vector may represent a substantial escalation in the already dangerous DDoS
landscape, with potential for events that will make recent attacks that have
been making headlines seem small by comparison. When combined with other
methods, particularly IoT botnets, we could soon see attacks reaching
previously unimaginable scale, with far-reaching impact. Terabit scale attacks
could soon become a common reality and could significantly impact the
availability of the Internet– at least degrading it in certain regions.”
Reflection and Amplification Attacks
In this case, the attacker sends a simple query to a
vulnerable reflector supporting the Connectionless LDAP service (CLDAP) and
using address spoofing makes it appear to originate from the intended victim.
The CLDAP service responds to the spoofed address, sending unwanted network traffic
to the attacker’s intended target.
Amplification techniques allow bad actors to intensify the
size of their attacks, because the responses generated by the LDAP servers are
much larger than the attacker’s queries. In this case, the LDAP service responses
are capable of reaching very high bandwidth and we have seen an average
amplification factor of 46x and a peak of 55x.
Dave Larson explains: “LDAP is not the first, and will
not be the last, protocol or service to be exploited in this fashion. Novel amplification attacks like this occur because there
are so many open services on the Internet that will respond to spoofed record
queries. However, a lot of these attacks could be eased by proper service
provider hygiene, by correctly identifying spoofed IP addresses before these
requests are admitted to the network. Specifically, following the best common
practice, BCP 38, described in the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) RFC
2827, which describes router configurations that are designed to eliminate spoofed
IP address usage by employing meaningful ingress filtering techniques, would
reduce the overall problem of reflected DDoS by at least an order of magnitude.
“Today’s DDoS attacks are increasingly automated, meaning
that attackers can switch vectors faster than any human can respond. The only
effective defense against this type of DDoS attack vector requires automated
mitigation techniques. Relying on out-of-band scrubbing DDoS protection to stop
these attacks will cause significant collateral damage. Given the short duration and high volume attacks, legacy solutions
simply cannot identify and properly mitigate in time to protect network
availability.”
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